In this paper, we investigate the social resource allocation in an emerging mobility system consisting of connected and automated vehicles (CAVs) using mechanism design. CAVs provide the most intriguing opportunity for enabling travelers to better monitor mobility system conditions and make better decisions. However, this new reality will influence travelers' tendency-of-travel and might give rise to rebound effects, e.g., increased vehicles' miles traveled. We propose a mechanism design formulation that provides an efficient social resource allocation. Our focus is on the socio-technical aspect of the problem. By designing appropriate incentives we seek to prevent potential rebound effects. In particular, we consider an economically inspired mechanism with the intention to influence the impact of the travelers' decision-making on the well-being of an emerging mobility system.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Motivation
Nowadays it is nearly impossible to commute in a major urban area without the frustration of a traffic jam or congestion. At an individual level, one at the very least might be late for dinner. But the reality is different in the sense that congestion leads to more accidents, altercations, and most importantly to a vast damage towards the environment (air pollution) caused by the huge numbers of idling engines. Thanks to evolutionary developments (e.g., CAVs) which are currently afoot, it is highly expected that we will be able to eliminate congestion completely and increase mobility efficiency in terms of fuel and travel time. However, urban social life has been greatly associated with the technological impact of the car which compels us to reassess the relationship between automobility and social life [1] , [2] . Based on this idea, it is vital to conduct research regarding the impact of CAVs from a socio-technical approach that focuses on the complexity of the social dynamics of CAVs. One way to do this is by treating automation in mobility as a quality of a socio-technical system for the following reason: the most novel and defining of all the formidable characteristics of the emerging mobility system is its socioeconomic complexity: the mobility system of the future will be unique among all automated systems in that it will enable extensive human-vehicle interaction, allow enhanced and universal accessibility, and finally through higher productivity and efficiency, a multitude of diverse economic interests This research was supported in part by ARPAE's NEXTCAR program under the award number de-ar0000796 and by the Delaware Energy Institute (DEI).
The authors are with the Department of Mechanical Engineering, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716 USA (emails: ichremos@udel.edu; andreas@udel.edu.) will flourish, in varying relationships of collaboration and competition with each other. Evident from similar technological revolutions (e.g., elevators' impact on building design and social class hierarchies [3] ), human social perspective and view can have a tremendous effect on how technological innovations are utilized and implemented. Similarly, CAVs are expected to become a socially disruptive innovation with vast technological, commercial, and regulatory dimensions. For example, in the form of rebound effects, the benefits of convenience and safety could potentially drive people to travel more frequently with a car and thus increase the traffic demand in the system. Even though CAVs do not exist yet, the motivation behind our research is the following fact: "uninfluenced social systems often exhibit suboptimal performance" [4] .
Part of our previous work was to model the human social interaction with CAVs as a social dilemma in a game theoretic approach [5] . We called it the social-mobility dilemma of an emerging mobility system consisting of CAVs. Now, using mechanism design (reverse game theory), we model the social-mobility dilemma as a resource allocation problem which then design appropriate protocols and rules which guarantee the implementation of a desired outcome (e.g., congestion-free) despite the self-interest of individual decision-makers. This paper suggests using mechanism design for designing the emerging mobility systems in a socio-technical approach. Mechanism design has been used for designing rules or protocols of economic systems based on autonomous, distributed, and selfish decision-makers for performance and efficiency. Mechanism design, a subfield of game theory, is defined as: "Mechanism design is the fundamental mathematical methodology for analyzing economic efficiency subject to incentive constraints." [6] . A mechanism may be defined as a "mathematical structure that models institutions through which economic activity is guided and coordinated" [7] . We are using the notion of a mechanism in this sense, although economic activity is done by allocating travel time among travelers in a mobility system. In this case, we build and design appropriate protocols and interfaces (e.g., tolls, subsidies) which guarantee the realization of a desired outcome (maximizing social welfare and congestion free). Most of the mechanism design concepts in this paper can be found in [8] .
B. Literature Review
The authors in [7] were the first to formulate a resource allocation problem within the framework of mechanism design. This led to a spark of research as mechanism design has been used extensively in communication networks in the form of decentralized resource allocation problems [9] , [10] , and also in transportation [11] , [12] . In such problems, the main methodology is to apply the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms [13] , [14] , [15] which are incentive mechanisms that achieve a socially-optimal solution as a dominant strategy. Because the VCG mechanisms have certain limitations (e.g., they are not budget balanced), there have been attempts to use different approaches to solve the mechanism design problem. For example, by adopting for a mechanism's solution concept the notion of a Nash equilibrium (NE), a surrogate optimization method can be used where the network manager asks the agents to report a bundle of messages that approximate their private information [16] , [17] .
On the other hand, in this paper, we focus on the social perspective of the emerging mobility systems with CAVs. It is widely accepted that CAVs will revolutionize urban mobility and the way people commute. One may ask "How will human social interaction affect an emerging mobility system?" An example would be to have CAVs travel without any travelers, i.e., CAVs could do empty trips for parking and thus add extra congestion in the network [18] . In addition, CAVs could potentially affect a driver's behavior and also have an impact on traffic performance in general [19] . The question of what is the actual impact of CAVs on travel, energy, and carbon demand is still studied [20] . Depending in different environmental indicators, the authors in [21] provided a practical microeconomic environmental rebound effect model. So far, there has been research on the effects of a considerate penetration of shared autonomous vehicles in a major metropolitan area [22] . However, most studies on CAVs have focused on how to model and optimize at interesctions, or platoons [23] . Moreover, [24] provides a framework that models shared autonomous vehicle; for a survey on autonomous vehicles, see [25] .
C. Contribution of the Paper
The main contribution of this paper is to model as a social resource allocation mechanism design problem the socialmobility dilemma of an emerging mobility system consisting with CAVs by proposing an enhanced incentive mechanism that possesses the following properties: 1) existence of at least one NE, 2) budget balance at the equilibrium outcome, 3) individually rational (or voluntary participation), 4) implementable at NE. Although, aspects of the proposed mechanism follow from [9] , we have made several additions that make the mechanism applicable in our context, i.e., emerging mobility systems.
D. Organization of the Paper
In Section II, we present the mathematical formulation of our mechanism. Then in Section III, we define the mechanism design problem. In Section IV, we provide the properties of our mechanism and their proofs. Lastly, in Section VI we provide concluding remarks, and we discuss the significance of our work and future work.
II. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION
We consider a mobility system represented by a graph G = (V, E), where V = {1, . . . , V } represents the index set of vertices and E = {1, . . . , E} the index set of directed edges. Each edge e ∈ E has a fixed capacity, i.e., c e ∈ R >0 . The capacity on the edges serves as a physical congestion constraint in the network. There are n ∈ N travelers and the set of travelers is denoted as I = {1, . . . , n} with n > 2. Each traveler i ∈ I is associated with an origin-destination pair
Assumption 1. We assume that each CAV corresponds to only one traveler. Connectivity and automation in mobility is expected to allow universal accessibility, and so it is natural to assume that each traveler has access to a CAV.
Each traveler i ∈ I seeks to travel from an origin o i to a destination d i . Furthermore, each traveler has κ ∈ N available routes to choose from. For each origin-destination pair r i = (o i , d i ), there exists a route p k ri ∈ P ri , where P ri is the set of all feasible routes for r i , and k = 1, . . . , κ. A route p k ri is a finite sequence of edges which joins a sequence of vertices, where both edges and vertices are distinct.
Next, we state a very important assumption of our formulation.
Assumption 2. For each pair r i , we assume that there is an alternative mode of transportation, e.g., public transportation such as train or light rail that connects o i to d i with infinite capacity.
As a consequence of Assumption 2, the network manager is able before designing the incentive mechanism to provide an alternative to a subset of travelers. Here is how it works: the travelers are asked to book in advance their route and inform the network manager who, after checking the edges' constraint, to advise some travelers to use public transportation. The network manager then proceeds to allocate the remaining travelers efficiently using an incentive mechanism.
A traveler i wishes to commute in r i and so they pick a route p k ri and specify their preferred travel time, denoted by θ i ; in game theory θ i can be said to be the type of traveler i. We have that θ i is non-negative and takes only finite values and we have that θ = (θ 1 , θ 2 , . . . , θ n ) denoting the type profile of the travelers.
Moreover, we have for traveler i's kth route,
Essentially, a traveler i's travel time is distributed to travel times on the edges, denoted by θ e i , that consist the kth route. Next, each traveler i has a satisfaction function denoted by v i which expresses the satisfaction that traveler i experiences from commuting at a given travel θ i . We treat each traveler's v i function to be their private information.
Assumption 3. We assume that v i is a differentiable (and so continuous), strictly concave, and monotonic in θ i with v i (0, α i , p k ri ) = 0. Assumption 3 is essential as it will allow us to utilize the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions later on in our analysis. Also, we explicitly have v i (0, α i , p k ri ) = 0 as a traveler that does not commute receives zero utility.
We denote by t i the monetary payment made by traveler i to the network. We have t i ∈ R as a positive t i means that traveler i pays a toll and a negative one means that i receives a monetary subdidy. Thus, in our mechanism, traveler i's total utility is given by:
where v i represents traveler i's satisfaction function, θ i is traveler i's preferred travel time, and α i is a positive constant which can be interpreted as "value of time," and p k ri is the chosen path.
The function v i can be interpreted as the commutesatisfaction of traveler i given the traveler i's value of time, the travel time, and the chosen route that connects their source to their destination. Formally, we have
The parameter α i will vary among travelers. Let us provide an interpretation of the social parameter α i : a traveler i with α i → 0 is said to be rushed, while in the case α i → 1, traveler i is unhurried (e.g., they do not mind if their commute takes longer). On the other hand, the idea of the toll is that travelers pay for time-access in their commute. Ideally, we would like to design a mechanism where the sum of all tolls/subsidies paid/received is equal to zero, i.e., i∈I t i = 0. As we will see later on, this will play an important role in the design of the payment rule.
Each traveler i ∈ I is modeled as a rational and strategic decision-maker. This means that they are only interested in maximizing their own utility function. In other words, travelers are utility-maximizers. Also, travelers only care about their commute and not about other travelers. Problem 1. Given r i = (o i , d i ) and p k ri for some k, each traveler i ∈ I solves the following:
subject to: θ i ≥ 0, and 0 ≤ α i ≤ 1.
Each traveler reports their preferred travel time which maximizes their commute-satisfaction by setting t i equal to the price they are willing to pay.
In contrast, the network manager's objective is to maximize the "overall social welfare" of the network and ensure that the network remains congestion-free. Definition 1. The social welfare function W is defined as
A social consequence of Problem 1 is that as travelers disregard the overall good in their decision most likely an edge e ∈ E will be utilized by more than two travelers. This indicates a natural competition over the utilization of the edges. So, we provide the following definition: Definition 2. Given e ∈ E, we define the following sets:
• the set of all travelers that edge e is part of their route is denoted by S e , • we say that an edge e is a "competitive edge" when it is utilized by more than two travelers and we denote by L the set of all such competitive edges, • the set R i as the collection of all competitive edges of a traveler i ∈ I.
The above definition allow us to partition the set of travelers to subgroups depending on their route-decision. That way we can check how many utilize an edge and thus affect the edge's capacity.
The centralized optimization problem of the network manager's goal is given below:
subject to:
where the inequalities (9) express the capacity constraints that must be satisfied at each network edge. Note that to solve the centralized problem using standard optimization methods, we require complete information.
As it is typical in mechanism design problems, strategic travelers are not expected to report their private information truthfully; this means that the network manager has to elicit the necessary information to solve the optimization problem of maximizing the social welfare.
Remark. The network manager essentially has to allocate the limited resources (time-access of the roads) of the mobility system to the strategic travelers by allocating time to each traveler and the appropriate toll for the route each traveler has chosen giving priority to those who are in a hurry. In that way, the network manager can alleviate the traffic demand and eliminate the possibility of congestion.
Remark. As a sum of strictly concave functions the objective function of Problem 2 is strictly concave. Also, the set of feasible travel times is nonempty, convex, compact. Thus, the solution θ * exists and is unique following optimization results in [26] .
A. Solution Concept of the Mechanism Design Problem
In both game theory and mechanism, a solution concept is said to be a specific rule which allows us to predict what a game's players/agents will decide collectively. One such example of a solution concept is a NE. In this paper, we consider as our solution concept a NE. However, a NE require complete information. We are able to apply the notion of a NE thanks to the following justification: interpret a NE as the fixed point of an iterative process [27] , [28] . This is in accordance with J. Nash's interpretation of a NE, i.e., the complete information NE can be a possible equilibrium of an iterative learning process. So, our mechanism is played multiple times in a static setting.
III. MECHANISM DESIGN PROBLEM
A. A Decentralized, Indirect Mechanism Design Problem with Strategic Travelers
Following the classic framework from [7] , in this section, we present the fundamentals of an incentive and indirect mechanism. First, we need to specify a set of messages that all travelers have access and are able to use in order to communicate information. Based on the information travelers make decisions which affect the reaction of the network manager. Once the communication between the designer and the travelers is complete, we say that the mechanism induces a game; rational travelers then compete for the network's resources. One possible goal of the network manager is to setup a mechanism that maximizes the social welfare of all travelers at all equilibria outcomes of the induced game. In this line of reasoning, we define formally below what we mean by indirect mechanism and then induced game.
A mechanism that is indirect can be described as a tuple of two components, namely M, g . We write M = (M 1 , . . . , M n ), where M i defines the set of possible messages of traveler i. Thus, the travelers' complete message space is given by:
The component g is the outcome function given by:
which maps each message profile to the output space
i.e., the set of all possible rate allocations to the travelers and the toll/subsidies paid/received by the travelers. The outcome function g determines the outcome, namely g(µ) for any given message profile µ = (m 1 , . . . , m n ) ∈ M. Furthermore, we have that the payment function
determines the monetary payment made or received by a traveler i ∈ I. Definition 3. A mechanism M, g together with the utility functions (u i ) i∈I induce a game
where each utility u i is evaluated at g(µ) for each traveler i ∈ I.
We are ready now to define the solution concept used in this paper. Definition 4. Given a game Γ, we take as a solution concept of the mechanism the NE defined as a message profile µ * such that
for all m i ∈ M i and for each i ∈ I.
In Definition 4, we used the notation m * −i which is equal to (m * 1 , . . . , m * i−1 , m * i+1 , . . . , m * n ) and is the message profile of all traveler except i. In words, the message profile µ * is a NE if for each i ∈ I, the message m * i maximizes the utility of traveler i, given the messages m * −i of all other travelers. Definition 5. When a mechanism at an equilibrium outcome does not require any external or internal monetary transfers, then we write i∈I t i (µ * ) = 0 (16) for all message profiles µ * . In this case, we call such a mechanism to be budget balanced.
Definition 6. Suppose the utility of no participation of a traveler i ∈ I to be u i (0) = 0. Then, we say that a mechanism is individually rational if
and all equilibrium outcomes µ * ∈ M.
B. Methodology: Surrogate Optimization
For practical reasons, the network manager ought to design a mechanism with a finite-dimensional message space, i.e., approximate the valuation function of each traveler based on a finite number of parameters that the traveler can report, and then maximize the sum of the approximated valuation functions. With this idea in mind, the network manager chooses a real-valued function given by
and then announces it to all travelers.
Assumption 4. We assume that the real-valued function f is continuous, differentiable, strictly concave, and increasing with f ′ (0) < ∞.
We give a summary of the communication process between the travelers and the network manager:
• at the beginning, each traveler reports p k ri , α i and β i , i.e., their chosen route, their value of time, and their social toll sensitivity, respectively, • at the same time, each traveler is asked to report a weight-parameter such that for w i > 0
by a monetary toll. In specific, the social toll sensitivity β i ∈ [β min , β max ] ⊂ R >0 can be viewed as a representation of the travelers' social wealth status. In other words, β i captures the tolls' social effect and their malleability to monetary incentives.
Remark. In our mechanism, we have taken into consideration the following important social parameters:
Now, once the travelers provide the above-mentioned reports, the network manager considers w i f (θ i , α i , p k ri ) as the surrogate valuation function of traveler i and maximizes the sum of surrogate valuation functions under the constraints of Problem 2 taking into account the maximum demands travelers want along their selected route. The goal is to align everyone's decisions by incentivizing travelers to send social-welfare supporting messages. To do that the network manager designs monetary incentives that align each traveler's objective with the social objective. In particular, we want to derive the optimal solution of the surrogate optimization and use it to get the resource allocation in the original mechanism. One particularly interesting method to achieve this is by basing the travelers' payments on the Lagrange multipliers associated with the optimal solution of the optimization Problem 2. We will determine the per-unit price of time per each edge using the Lagrange multipliers so that the total payment of a traveler over all edges internalizes her effect on the social welfare [9] .
Before we continue, let us define explicitly m i ∈ M i . We have
where w i is the weight for the surrogate optimization problem; z i is the maximum demand rate, i.e., z i ∈ [0, z max i ]; τ i is the price a traveler i is willing to pay along the entire route.
Also, we have the following:
For an arbitrary µ ∈ M, the outcome function g evaluated at µ takes the form
where the allocation function y i : (0, +∞) × [0, z max i ] → R >0 determines the travel time given only a partial part (w, z) of the message profile µ.
The surrogate optimization problem that the network manager is set to solve is stated below: Problem 3. We have the following surrogate optimization problem:
Notice that since the objective function in Problem 3 is concave and the constraints define a non-empty, convex, and compact region, the unique solution of Problem 3 can be evaluated by the well-defined allocation function. Thus, we write the solution of Problem 3
where w = (w 1 , . . . , w n ) and z = (z 1 , . . . , z n ). Before we discuss the payment rule, let us provide a few more necessary definitions: Definition 8. The centroid of a set of vectors is the vector whose coordinates are the mean values of the coordinates of all the vectors in the set. The centroid of the set of Lagrange multiplier vectors of the optimization problem corresponding to the capacity constraints, when the set of weights w and the set of maximum demands z are announced by the travelers is denoted by λ(w, z) = (λ e (w, z)) e∈E .
At the beginning of the mechanism and since each traveler has given us their chosen route, we provide to them a fair share the edge's capacity, i.e., c e /S e , for each edge e ∈ E of their route. Definition 9. We define τ e −i as the average of the prices proposed for edge e by all travelers competing to utilize e other than traveler i, i.e.,
With this we can define the payment function on a particular edge e ∈ E of our mechanism as
Given the message profile µ, we define t i evaluated at µ to be paid/received by each traveler i as follows:
The first term of (28) is the toll/subsidy paid/received by traveler i for their travel time allocation y i (w, z) over edge e. Intuitively this means that an agent i will pay a toll that is determined by the other travelers' recommendations and only for the excess of the fair share of travelers over this edge. This formulation allows us to remove any control of agent i over the toll and thus, there is no incentive to lie and reduce the toll. As for the second term of (28), we essentially have introduced a penalty that a traveler i has to pay unless they announce a price τ e i that is equal to λ e (w, z). Hence, at equilibrium the prices at each edge will be uniformly equal to the Lagrange multiplier for Problem 3
Next, we present the properties of our mechanism and provide their proofs.
IV. PROPERTIES OF OUR MECHANISM In this section, following closely [9] , we present the properties of the proposed mechanism. Proposition 1. Problem 3 has a unique solution.
Proof. The objective function of Problem 3 is a sum of several strictly concave functions. Hence, it is strictly concave. Also, we have non-emptiness, convexity, and compactness of the feasible region. Thus, Problem 3 always has a unique solution.
Let us discuss now the optimality conditions, often referred to as the KKT conditions, of Problem 3. Lemma 1. Given w and z we have that y(w, z) is the unique solution of Problem 3 if, and only if it satisfies the feasibility conditions of Problem 3 and there exists a Lagrange multiplier vector λ(w, z) that satisfies the following KKT conditions for all travelers:
Proof. One can get the KKT conditions of Problem 3 by following the standard form [26] .
Lemma 2. Let µ * be a NE of the induced game. Then, we have τ e i * = λ e (w * , z * ),
for all i ∈ I and each e ∈ R i .
Proof. First, we start with the definition of a NE, i.e.,
(34) Now, suppose there is only one traveler, say i, that deviates from the equilibrium message profile µ * and instead reports the same message but with a different price τ i . This deviation to be justifiable has to provide a higher utility to traveler i. 
So, τ * i is the solution of the following minimization problem:
It follows that the solution is τ e i * = λ e (w * , z * ).
From Lemma 2, it is straightforward to show the next result. 
Proof. We have the following 
which it follows that it is equal to zero by the KKT conditions.
Proposition 2. For an arbitrary message profile µ, the allocation rate vector is a feasible point of Problem 2.
Proof. It follows from the fact that the feasible set of Problem 3 is a subset of the feasible set of Problem 2.
Theorem 2 (Individually Rational). The mechanism is individually rational, i.e., each traveler weakly prefers the outcome of every NE of the game induced by the mechanism, to the outcome of not participating.
Proof. Let the message profile µ * be an arbitrary NE of the induced game. For each traveler i there is a pair (w i , z i ) such that y i ((w i , w * −i ), (z i , z * −i )) = 0. Consider the message
with τ i = λ e ((w i , w * −i ), (z i , z * −i )). Since µ * is a NE, we have the following inequality for the utilities (computed with zero input):
Thus, from equation (45), the result follows.
Theorem 3 (Implementation). At an arbitrary NE µ * of the induced game, the allocation rate vector y(w * , z * ) is equal to the optimal solution of Problem 2.
Proof. The Lagrangian of Problem 2 is given by
and the KKT conditions are
With τ * e = λ * e , we have 
Thus, θ * is the only feasible point of Problem 2 satisfying the conditions (49) and (50). On the other hand, we do know that y(w * , z * ) is also a feasible point of Problem 2 and it follows that y(w * , z * ) satisfies the above conditions. Thus, as λ is non-negative, we have that y(w * , z * ) = θ * .
So far, we have assumed the existence of NE of the induced game. The following theorem shows that a NE exists.
Theorem 4. Let θ * be the optimal solution of Problem 2 and λ * e be the corresponding Lagrange multipliers of the KKT conditions. Then µ * with τ * e = λ * e is a NE of the induced game.
Proof. Consider an optimal solution θ which we know that exists already for Problem 2. It follows from Theorem 3 that θ * is the optimal solution of Problem 3 as it also satisfies the capacity, non-negativity, and demand constraints. Thus, we have y(w * , z * ) = θ * . It is clear that the message profile µ is a NE as it satisfies the KKT conditions of Problem 2 with τ i = λ e . V. DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS AND LIMITATIONS In our attempt to keep the mechanism simple, we assumed that the network manager will have access to vital information, e.g., value of time, chosen route, social toll sensitivity. That way, it is possible to check the network's capacity constraints and allocate a number of travelers to public transportation. In general, by considering a resource allocation mechanism design framework, we are able to analyze rigorously the allocation of a divisible resource (in our case that was travel time) to a group of n travelers/decisionmakers while introducing the idea of social incentives in our problem. This theoretical framework is powerful and allows us to gain valuable insight of the nature of the problem and its solution; yet it remains an open question whether a mechanism is computationally trackable for each traveler to figure out. One key issue that arises, is the amount of information and the process of exchange of that information to the network manager. Immediately, the question of certainty regarding the intact of information remains.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we formulate the human social interaction with CAVs in an emerging mobility system as a social resource allocation and proposed an incentive mechanism. We introduced two social parameters in the mechanism, namely value of time, and malleability to incentives. We showed that the mechanism is individually rational, budget balanced, implementable, and at least one NE exists. The incentive mechanism succeeds in allocating the travel times to the agents and thus prevents one major rebound effect, i.e., congestion. Future work will expand the framework shown here to enhance the behavioral model and introduce sophisticated notions to capture the intricacies of human behavior. Furthermore, future work will also investigate different functional forms of the utility functions under dynamic settings and provide an analytical framework for dynamic multidimensional allocations.
